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Knowledge E

Given a Lewisian semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest potential worlds in which not-p, the topic doesn't imagine that p. Socrates articulates the need for something like a justification condition in Plato’s Theaetetus, when he factors out that “true opinion” is generally inadequate for knowledge. For instance, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a perception that happens to be true, this perception is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge. Sometimes when people are very confident of something that seems to be mistaken, we use the word “knows” to describe their situation. Speaking loosely, one might even say that many people “knew” that Clinton would win the election—until she misplaced. Hazlett argues on the premise of knowledge like this that “knows” just isn't a factive verb.Hazlett’s analysis is deeply controversial; most epistemologists will treat sentences...